(Here is my third post in a vein of thought attempting to place sociolinguistics on a more firm theoretical basis, trying to incorporate the transformational grammarian Chomksy’s insights and dominant sociolinguist William Labov. The first was “New Perspectives for Sociolinguistics: A Treatise on Symbolic Interactionism” and the second was “Discourse on Determinism: The Structure of the Historical Dialectic”.)
The word “lexicon” means vocabulary, of a specific discipline, vein of knowledge, or just in general. It, thus, also means dictionary, the sum total of knowable words. In fact, another term for “words”, or just the singular “word”, is also “lexical item”. So a word could be called a lexical item and a lexicon can be considered an accumulation of lexical items. In effect, the lexicon and thus the words that make it up form the physical basis of what language is. Look at any book, article, or pamphlet and the linguistic basis on which it is predicated will be just a collection of words, much like “society” is just a collection of people, and a forest is just a collection of trees and other greenery (re: “On the Arbitrary Definition of Abstract Terms”).
But is that really all that language boils down to? Of course not. There are significant mental components, such as grammatical and transformational rules, which don’t fall under the physically-based lexicon. They could be physically represented, but most of it is implicit within the words themselves. Chomsky calls to the reality of this mental component numerous times, such as in his 1965 Aspects of the Theory of Syntax, when he distinguishes between use of the lexical items for communicative purposes, and the proper role of a disciplined linguistics. I agree that “linguistic theory is mentalistic, since it is concerned with discovering a mental reality underlying actual behavior”, but I disagree that “[o]bserved use of language or hypothesized dispositions to respond, habits, and so on, may provide evidence as to the nature of this mental reality, but surely it cannot constitute the actual subject matter of linguistics, if this is to be a serious discipline” (4). There seems to be a distinct, conflicting tension between the substance of language as it relates to the mind, and the specific function of language as it relates to other people.
Why does it have to be so? Why cannot the systematic study of language use in society be the proper domain of some sort of linguistics? I will very well agree that such perspective of social language use is not all that the study of linguistics boils down to, no one would argue that, but it surely must be within the domain of the study of language. It doesn’t have to be so contradictory to combine both the intrinsic, innate substance of what language is with the functionalist perspective of what language can do (as it relates to communication between people in society). A common reaction against sociolinguistics understood as the micro-basis of language use in society is that it is dependent on theories of symbolism and abstract meaning in a way that linguistics proper doesn’t. But even linguistics proper relies on some sort of external theory of meaning. Chomsky’s 1965 Aspects is about English grammar and syntax, and even his earlier work on Hebrew language, as well as the work done with other languages, all rely on the words and letters of the language itself as symbols.
So it can be seen that perhaps all of analysis of language is dependent on an external theory of meaning, not just that which is needed to successfully interpret pragmatics, or the value of information contained in conversational exchange. This notion of semiotics, or the study of symbols and their use or interpretation, seems to be central to every sort of linguistics, reflecting the importance of the “underlying mental reality”. In fact, semiotics, as a theory of symbolic meaning, could be thought of as “superior”, or a priori, to a specific type of symbolism, the symbols of language, or “linguistics” proper. The entire notion of written text as a secondary medium of linguistic expression implies a radically easier way of communicative transmission, either with other people, which is called synchronic, or through time, which is called diachronic (referring to the popular sociolinguist William Labov’s influential methodology).
So perhaps rigorous study of social language use can inform us about the “underlying mental reality” of syntactic, generative grammars, at least as much as introspective analysis can. Although it is not necessary for language to be intended for communication, that doesn’t change the pragmatic observation that the majority of the time that language exists it is in communication with others. Therefore, language use in society must be a fundamental and important aspect of examining linguistics systematically. And there doesn’t even need to be so sharp of a distinction between the mental reality that sociolinguistics examines and the mental reality that linguistics proper examines, either. Linguistics proper and sociolinguistics can possibly bring to light different, supporting, equally valid perspectives of the “underlying mental reality”. But it should be obvious that linguistics proper, focused as it is on such “underlying mental reality”, can come a long way in discovering the true state of the mind as it relates to symbolic manipulation. It is fundamental that sociolinguistics pays attention to such developments and critically understands the extent of implications from the study. Just as linguistics proper can discover the “underlying mental reality”. Similarly, perhaps a properly framed sociolinguistics can provide us with insights into the underlying social reality that forms the fabric of that ties people together in society, as examined by their language use.
Much like psychological insights can also inform our understanding of the “underling mental reality”, as is the study of linguistics proper, it takes anthropological insights in order to frame the objective of sociolinguistics. And in all philosophic theories, it isn’t necessarily a one-way street. Psychological theories can inform our understanding of the “underlying mental reality” just as linguistics proper can; anthropological insights can inform our conception of the “underlying social reality” much in the way that sociolinguistics can. Along with this, archaeology can inform us of the “underlying political past” much like history strives to. This is not only a necessity on the part of all social theories to borrow concepts and methodologies from other areas of study, but ultimately reflects the inherent interconnectedness of all social theory.
First, we have to recognize the diversity and complexity of the external repository of symbols. This isn’t just the length and breadth of the lexicon, as the total accumulation of lexical items, or words. But in reality, the extent diversity and complexity of an external symbolic repository is more of a mere reflection of the total amount of symbolic meaning that could exist. For example, for English speakers, a bit of German can demonstrate how many unique phenomena are out there, but for which we lack English words for. Schadenfreude roughly means joy derived from another’s pain or sorrow; gemütlichkeit is a word that means a cheerful and/or delightful mood brought on by the feelings of social acceptance. So not only is there a great myriad of complicated English words (such as “ontological”), but there is a great number of non-English words that are very observant of natural phenomena and can thus enhance our awareness (think of the South American word “mamihlapinatapai”, eh?).
Secondly, what happens when we are able to view and understand something better than what is commonly understood, or can describe/explain it better than the dictionary definition does? In such a case, it is true that a complex philosophic case should or must be put together to change how this word is used and interpreted. There are numerous examples, as when someone tries to understand art as not just paintings and poetry, but that everything can, in a sense, be artistic. Rather than changing the actual definition of art, or of the artistic, the ultimate effect is of changing how people understand what art is. Philosophy is not just pondering the nature of abstract meaning and the deepest questions of all that life is and/or can be, but is just “the love of wisdom” and is thus bound in everything as well. Thomas Kuhn’s popularization of the word “paradigm” was likewise a major revolution in people’s capacity to understand the world around them (as well as the world in a macroscopic, global sense).
Thirdly, related to the second, we have the opportunity to create a word from scratch, or from other predisposed symbols, like letters. This is like when Charles Pierce devised “pragmaticism” as distinct from “pragmatism” in order to focus on that which is practical and not artistic. In this way, Pierce was able to take an older word, add a few letters, and distinguish himself and his ideas. Pragmatism, which deals with the nature of action of behavior, is thus distinct from pragmaticism, which emphasizes practical, every day affairs. In this way, even artists can talk about the practicality of their day-to-day work without getting too deep into the origins of unique creativity in their work, or the art of their art. Both instances would be talking about action and behavior, but only in the pragmaticist sense is the practical reality emphasized.
All three methods of interpreting symbolic meaning involve some sort of creativity. Along with an internal source of creativity, all three involve and aspect of pre-disposed, external repository of symbols, like letters and lexical items which make up the present lexicon. This is how symbolic interaction must be understood – as some sort of neo-Platonism, the notion that abstract mental entities might not exist without the human mind, but that contemporary reality dictates that children being born at this and future moments have to come to grips with the diverse and complex extent of external symbolic meaning, as it exists right now. But it is the nature of such symbolic meaning that we can create our own symbols to bring harmony and rhythm to what can, at first, seem like a daunting, clunky nightmare. If no humans existed, there would perhaps be no abstract conceptualization in the way of philosophy or science, and therefore our actions and ideas have an extraordinary effect on the structure of abstract concepts going into the future, just as the present structure of abstract concepts has an extraordinary effect on the next generation growing up.
In summary, there doesn’t have to be tension between the introspective methods of linguistics proper and the externally-based theories of meaning that a sociolinguistics must rely on. They can and should mutually support and reinforce one another. In fact, the linguist proper should support the sociolinguist to the most and best s/he can (and vice versa). If it is what language that is being studied, then all sorts of linguists should find each other’s specialized disciplines highly interesting. We should thus drop the conflicts that may be found between us, for the sake of the young grade schooler who is just learning and becoming interested in language’s power of conveying meaning and reflecting the structure of mind. In some way, we are all linguists just by being interested in language and open-minded to learning about it, and unless we drop unnecessary conflicts, realize we have way more in common than that which separates us, and come together to celebrate what diversity there is, then we threaten turning off the young quasi-linguist to the profession.